Abstract-To effectively support communication in such a dynamic networking environment as the ad hoc networks, the routing mechanisms should adapt to secure and trusted route discovery and service quality in data transmission. In this context, the paper proposed a routing protocol called Node Centric Trust based Secure Hybrid Routing Protocol [FHC-NCTSR] that opted to fixed hash chaining for data transmission and node centric trust strategy for secure route discovery. The route discovery is reactive in nature, in contrast to this, data transmission is proactive, hence the protocol FHC-NCTSR termed as hybrid routing protocol. The performance results obtained from simulation environment concluding that due to the fixed hash chaining technique opted by FHC-NCTSR, it is more than one order of magnitude faster than other hash chain based routing protocols such as SEAD in packet delivery. Due to the node centric strategy of route discovery that opted by FHC-NCTSR, it elevated as trusted one against to Rushing, Routing table modification and Tunneling attacks, in contrast other protocols failed to provide security for one or more attacks listed, example is ARIADNE that fails to protect from tunneling attack.
with the fact that all updates in the wireless communication environment travel over the air and are, thus, costly in transmission resources. Routing protocols for ad hoc networks can be classified either as proactive, reactive or hybrid. Proactive or table driven protocols continuously evaluate the routes within the network, so that when a packet needs to be forwarded, the route is already known and can be immediately used. Examples of proactive protocols include DSDV [2] , TBRPF [3] , and WRP [4] . In contrast, reactive or on-demand protocols invoke a route determination procedure on an ondemand basis by flooding the network with the route query. Examples of reactive protocols include AODV [5] , DSR [6] , and TORA [7] . The on-demand discovery of routes can result in much less traffic than the proactive schemes, especially when innovative route maintenance schemes are employed. However, the reliance on flooding of the reactive schemes may still lead to a considerable volume of control traffic in the highly versatile ad hoc networking environment. Moreover, because this control traffic is concentrated during the periods of route discovery, the route acquisition delay can be significant. In Section II, we explore the third class of routing protocols the hybrid protocols.
II. PROTOCOL HYBRIDIZATION
The diverse applications of ad hoc network pose a challenge for designing a single protocol that operates efficiently across a wide range of operational conditions and network configurations. Each of the purely proactive or purely reactive protocols described above performs well in a limited region of this range. For example, reactive routing protocols are well suited for networks where the "call to mobility" ratio is relatively low. Proactive routing protocols, on the other hand, are well suited for networks where this ratio is relatively high. The performance of both of the protocol classes degrades when they are applied to regions of ad hoc network space between the two extremes. Given multiple protocols, each suited for a different region of the ad hoc network design space, it makes sense to capitalize on each protocol's strengths by combining them into a single strategy (i.e. hybridization). In the most basic hybrid routing strategy, one of the protocols would be selected based on its suitability for the specific network's characteristics. Although not an elegant solution, such a routing strategy has the potential to perform as well as the best suited protocol for any scenario, and may outperform either protocol over the entire ad hoc network design space. Applications, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2012 81 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org However, by not using both protocols together, this approach fails to capitalize on the potential synergy that would make the routing strategy perform as well as or better than either protocol alone for any given scenario. A more promising approach for protocol hybridization is to have the base protocols operate simultaneously, but with different "scopes" (i.e., hybridization through multi scoping). For the case of a two-protocol routing strategy, protocol A would operate locally, while the operation of protocol B would be global. The key to this routing strategy is that the local information acquired by protocol A is used by protocol B to operate more efficiently. Thus the two protocols reinforce each other's operation. This routing strategy can be tuned to network behavior simply by adjusting the size of the protocol A's scope. In one extreme configuration, the scope of protocol A is reduced to nothing, leaving protocol B to run by itself. As the scope of protocol A is increased, more information becomes available to protocol B, thereby reducing the overhead produced by protocol B. At the other extreme, protocol A is made global, eliminating the load of protocol B altogether. So, at either extreme, the routing strategy defaults to the operation of an individual protocol. In the wide range of intermediate configurations, the routing strategy performs better than either protocol on its own.
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The rest of the paper, section II explores the related work, section III discuss the route discovery strategy of FHC-NCTSR and section IV describes the data transmission approach that fallowed by section V, which explores simulations and results discussion. Section VI is conclusion and section VII explores the bibliography.
III. RELATED WORK
There are known techniques for minimizing 'Byzantine' failures caused by nodes that through malice or malfunction exhibit arbitrary behavior such as corrupting, forging, and delaying routing messages. A routing protocol is said to be Byzantine robust when it delivers any packet from a source node to a destination as long as there is at least one valid route [8] . However, the complexity of that protocol makes it unsuitable for ad hoc networks. Hauser et al [9] avoid that defect by using hash chains to reveal the status of specific links in a link-state algorithm. Their method also requires synchronization of the nodes. Hu [10] introduced another technique called SEAD that uses a node-unique hash chain that is divided into segments. The segments are used to authenticate hop counts. However, DSDV distributes routing information only periodically. The protocols [8, 9, 10] failed to perform when networks with hops in large scale due to their computational complexity in hash chain measurement. In many applications, reactive or on demand routing protocols are preferred. With on demand routing, source nodes request routes only as needed. On demand routing protocols performs better with significantly lower overhead than periodic routing protocols in many situations [11] . The authentication mechanism of Ariadne [11] is based on TESLA [12] . They use only efficient symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. The main drawback of that approach is the requirement of clock synchronization, which is very hard for wireless ad hoc networks. And the protocols [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] failed to protect networks from one or more attacks such as tunneling attack.
The protocol FHC-NCTSR proposed in this paper having much scope to perform better in large networks, since its less computational complexity. The node centric and two hop level authentication strategies that opted by FHC-NCTSR helps to deal with various attacks that includes tunneling attack.
IV. ROUTE DISCOVERY PROCESS
Objective of the NCTS-DSR route establishment process is preventing unauthorized hops to join in root during route request process [Here cer n i is because the current node certificate is available at sender node as certificate of one hop node that acts as target for ingress transaction]
Step 3: a. If cer n e is null then assumes sender is source and continues step 4.
b. Else If
cer n e is not null and then source node n s is valid and continues step 5 b. If cer n e is valid then that RREQ packet will be considered and continues step 5 else that packet will be discarded.
Step 
2) Process of RREQ construction at relay hop node of the source node
Once packet received by next hop (in that packet referred as) then continues the above four steps in sequence with minor changes, described here: 
A. Process of RREP packet validation and construction at first hop node of the destination node

1) Elliptic Curve Cryptography for constrained environments
To form a cryptographic system using elliptic curves, we need to find a "hard problem" corresponding to factoring the product of two primes or taking the discrete algorithm. 
n ECPK n n G n n G n ECPK 
Strength of this key exchange process is to break this scheme, an attacker would need to be able to compute k given G and kG , which is assumed hard and almost not possible in constrained environments
C. Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption
The plaintext message m is taken as input in the form of bits of varying length. This message m is encoded and is sent in the cryptographic system as x-y point m P . This point is encrypted as cipher text and subsequently decrypted. The SHA hash function algorithm can be used as Message digestion and Signature authentication and verification for the message.
As with the key exchange system, an encryption/decryption system requires a point G and an elliptic group E (a, b) as parameters. Each user A selects a private key 
VI. ROUTING THE DATA PACKETS:
Here in this section we describe the procedure of authentication data packets forwarded from the source node to the destination node, along the selected route, while checking for faulty links.
In DSR, the source route information is carried in each packet header. In the interest of route maintenance, every hop in rout contains a cache that maintains hop list describing the route selected using an optimal route selection model. We apply More particularly, during a route discovery phase, we provide secure route selection, i.e., a shortest intact route, that is, a route without any faulty links. During route maintenance phase, while packets are forwarded, we also detect faulty links based on a time out condition. Receiving an acknowledgement control packet signals successful delivery of a packet.
A. FHC: Fixed Hash Chaining
For packet authentication, we use () h f described by Benjamin Arazi et al [21] . The hash function encodes a countersign to form a tag.
By () h f we mean that the countersign cannot be decoded from the tag and the countersign is used only once, because part of its value lies in its publication after its use. We have adapted that protocol for use in an ad hoc network where multiple packets need to be sent sequentially. Therefore, if a number of packets are sent sequentially, the countersign needs to be refreshed each time. Thus, a single authentication is associated with a stream of future packets that is significant difference between proposed and existing hash chain techniques. The existing models require stream of future events. In addition, the countersign is used to authenticate c p but not for future packets.
As an advantage over prior art asymmetric digital signature or secret countersigns do not need to be known ahead of time or distributed among the nodes after the system becomes operational. It should also be noted, that each countersign is used only one time, because the countersign is published to perform the authentication.
The () h f as implemented by the proposal is ideal for serially communicating packets along a route in an ad hoc network, without requiring the nodes to establish shared secret countersigns beforehand. 
B. Data transmission and malicious hop detection
To send a packet i m that is a part of data to be sent to destination node d n , the source node s n picks two counter model, the packets are always received as in the order they sent. This is because all packets are forwarded along the same route in DSR. In the case of congestion and buffering, the messages are stored in a first-in-first-out buffer according to the order that they are received.
The experiments were conducted using NS 2. We build a simulation network with hops under mobility and count of 50 to 200. The simulation parameters described in table 5 . Authentication ensures that the buffer is properly allocated to valid packets. The simulation model aimed to compare ARIADNE [11] and FHC-NCTSR for route establishing phase, SEAD [10] and FHC-NCTSR for data transmission. The performance check of ARIADNE [11] and FHC-NCTS protocols carried out against to the threats listed below.
a) Rushing attack b) Denial of service c) Routing table modification d) Tunneling
The protection against tunneling attack is the advantage of the NCTS-DSR over Ariadne. Figure 3 (a) shows the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) for FHC-NCTSR, ARIADNE and SEAD. Based on these results it is evident that FHC-NCTSR recovers most of the PDR loss that observed in ARIADNE against to SEAD. The approximate PDR loss recovered by FHC-NCTSR over ARIADNE is 1.5%, which is an average of all pauses. The minimum individual recovery observed is 0.18% and maximum is 2.5%. Figure 3 Vol. 3, No. 7, 2012 88 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org FHC-NCTSR this advantage become possible. The Packet overhead observed in ARIADNE is average 5.29% more than packet overhead observed in FHC-NCTSR. The minimum and maximum packet overhead in ARIADNE over FHC-NCTSR observed is 3.61% and 7.29% respectively. It is quite evident from fig 3(c) , that SEAD is not stable to handle the packet overhead, over a period of time the packet overhead is abnormal compared to other two protocols considered.
MAC load overhead is slightly more in FHC-NCTSR over ARIADNE. We can observe this in figure 3(d) , which is because of additional control packet exchange in FHC-NCTSR for neighbor hop validation through certificate exchange. The average MAC load overhead in FHC-NCTSR over ARIADNE 1.64%. The minimum and maximum MAC load overhead observed is 0.81 and 3.24% respectively. 

, here z is number of nodes and n is number of hashes, as of the chaining concept of SEAD and ARIADNE z is equal to n but in FHC-NCTSR n always 2 VII. CONCLUSION This paper was presented an evaluation of security protocols such as QoS-Guided Route Discovery [13] , sQos [15] , Ariadne [16] and CONFIDANT [17] , which are based on reactive DSR approach, and describes their limitations and attacks against these protocols that can be subtle and difficult to discover by informal reasoning about the properties of the protocols.
The proposed a hybrid protocol FHC-NCTSR protocol applies digital signature exchange on the RREQ and RREP that they contribute the neighbors within 2 hops away from a node in computing them and a fixed hash chaining technique was used to achieve scalable data sending process. In route discovery phase, these digital signatures enable the protocol to (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2012 89 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org avoid malicious nodes from participating in routing and route discovery and also able to detect falsified routing messages and the responsible nodes.
And the fixed hash chaining in data transfer limits the computation cost and resource utilization.
